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MICHIGAN LAW R EVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocESS-RESIDENCE SusTTUTED FOR DOMI-
cnL As BAsis FOR DIVORCE JuRISDICTION-Plaintiff husband brought a
divorce action under an Arkansas statute, which granted state courts divorce
jurisdiction on the basis of residence of one of the parties within Arkansas
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for three months,' to terminate a marriage performed in another jurisdic-
tion. Defendant wife, domiciled in California, filed a cross complaint for
separate maintenance and attacked the court's jurisdiction to grant the
divorce. The lower court held the act unconstitutional in eliminating
domicile of one of the parties as a jurisdictional requirement in a divorce
action, and, finding that the plaintiff was not domiciled in Arkansas, dis-
missed the suit. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The due
process clause of the Federal Constitution does not require domicile as
a requisite to divorce jurisdiction. Wheat v. Wheat, (Ark. 1958) 318 S.W.
(2d) 793.
Domicile2 of at least one of the parties in the state of the forum is usually
a statutory requisite to jurisdiction in a divorce action.3 Only one case,
however, has reached the conclusion that domicile is a constitutional neces-
sity for jurisdiction under the due process clause.4 The opposite result,
reached in the principal case, seems more sound. The initial basis upon
which domicile could be asserted as a constitutional requirement is that
the divorce action is one in rem and the res, marital status, is located only
at the domicile of either party.5 If the subject of an in rem action is not
within the territory of the court, the court has no jurisdiction to act; a
judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction offends due process.6
The basic premise of the argument, however, that the divorce action is one
in rem, has been rejected by the courts.7 The second basis for regarding
domicile as a requirement of due process rests on the alleged co-extensive-
ness of the jurisdictional requirements for due process and full faith and
credit. Since the Supreme Court has held that a divorce decree rendered
by a state in which neither of the parties is domiciled is not entitled to full
3Ark. Stat. (1957) §34-1208.1.
2 Residence can be established by physical presence within a jurisdiction, but domicile
requires physical presence plus the intent to make one's home therein. See Price v. Price,
156 Pa. 617, 27 A. 291 (1893); Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813); STUMBERO, CoN-
ruicr OF LAws, 2d ed., 20 (1951); STORY, CONFLICr OF LAws, 8th ed., §41 (1883); CONFLicr
OF LAWS RMrATEMENT §9 (1934).
a Williams v. North Carolina, 325 US. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); 2
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 619 (1945); ScHOULER, DIVORCE MANUAL 21 (1944); CON-
Fucr OF LAws RESTATEMENT §111 (1934); 27 C.J.S. §71 (1941).
4 Alton v. Alton, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 667, three judges dissenting, app. dismissed
as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). See also GooDRuCH, CONFLICr OF LAws, 3d ed., 55 (1949);
note, 67 HARv. L. REV. 516 at 517 (1954). But see Murphy, J., concurring in Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 at 239 (1945); Frankfurter, J., concurring in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 at 306 (1942); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414 at 417, 320 P. (2d)
1020 (1958).
5 The common law viewed the "marital entity" as the husband. Hence his domicile
was the domicile of the marital entity. With recognition of the wife's independent status
courts treated the domicile of the marital entity as that of either the husband or the wife.
The possibility of two domiciles of the marital entity has caused much confusion. See
generally Rheinstein, "The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction," 22 UNIv. Cm. L. REV.
775 (1955).
0 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Williams v. North Carolina, 317 US. 287
(1942), overruled Haddock but not on this point.
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faith and credits it is argued that the initial rendering of the decree must
violate due process. This general theory of co-extensiveness has little case
authority to support it, although there is likewise little authority requir-
ing a contrary result.9 But it appears that at least in divorce cases the
jurisdictional requirements for due process are not co-extensive with the
jurisdictional requirements for full faith and credit. Full faith and credit
is denied on jurisdictional grounds to divorce decrees of non-domiciliary
states to protect the dominant interest of the domiciliary state in the
marital affairs of its citizens.O The jurisdictional demands of due process,
on the other hand, are designed to preserve fundamental fairness in deter-
mining the rights of the parties to the action." Since the domiciliary state
is not a party to the action, any failure to consider its interests in deter-
mining requirements for jurisdiction would not be objectionable on due
process grounds.12 To determine that due process is offended because of
the greater interest in the domiciliary state in the marital affairs of its
citizens is to reason from considerations unrelated to due process ideas of
fundamental fairness.13 Although some contact between the rendering
state and the marital status may be essential for fundamental fairness several
decisions have indicated that contacts other than domicile are sufficient
to fulfill the constitution's demands.14
SWilliams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Rice v. Rice, 386 US. 674 (1949).
9 See Alton v. Alton, note 4 supra, at 684; Stumberg, "Jurisdiction To Divorce," 24 TEx.
L. Rav. 119 at 123-124 (1946); Stimson, "Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness
of the Domiciliary Theory," 42 A.BA.J. 222 at 224-225 (1956).
10 The interest of the domiciliary state in the marital affairs of its citizens is consid-
ered paramount over all other states; to avoid the determinative effect of the rendering
state's judgment, the conclusion is reached that the court was without jurisdiction, and
therefore its judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit. See Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 825 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 at 298 (1942); Stum-
berg, "Jurisdiction To Divorce," 24 TEx. L. Rav. 119 at 130-181 (1946). But see Rodman,
"Bases of Divorce Jursdiction," 39 ILL. L. Rav. 843 at 362-363 (1945).
11 See Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319 (1987); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947).
12 The Alton court concluded due process was offended by divorce jurisdiction without
domicile because the real state of domicile would be deprived of its control over the
marital status. Yet the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to persons.
The wording itself indicates this: "No person shall be deprived of...." See Clark, J.,
dissenting in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 849 U.S. 1 at 16 (1955); Lorenzen, "Had-
dock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 YALE L.J. 341 at 852 (1948); note, 54 COL. L. Rav. 415 at
419 (1954).
Is The domicile requirement, not a traditional requirement of fairness, stems from the
nineteenth century judicial notions of comity among the states. See Costas, "Divorce and
Domicile: Where Confusion Reigns Supreme," 5 SYvAcusE L. Ray. 219 (1954); Griswold,
"Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study," 65
HARV. L. Rav. 193 (1951); Cook, "Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?" 18 IND. L.J. 165
(1943). See also Rheinstein, "The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction," 22 UNiv. Cm. LAW
Rav. 775 (1955).
14 See Wallace v. Wallace, note 4 supra (one year's residence); David-Zieseniss v. Ziese-
ness, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S. ( 2d) 649 (1954) (parties married in the state); Craig v.
Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P. (2d) 464 (1986) (domiciliary test eliminated for servicemen sta-
tioned in the state). But see Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 S. (2d) 236 (1948) (resi-
dence alone held insufficient for jurisdiction).
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Domicile is a jurisdictional requirement for full faith and credit pur-
poses primarily to protect the interest of states having predominant interests
in the marital relation.15 Such protection may be desirable, but a far more
sound means of accomplishing this end would be to compel the render-
ing state to apply the laws of the state determined to have the predominant
interest in the marital relation.16 Rather than regarding domicile as a
jurisdictional requirement, predominant interest should merely indicate
the choice of law to be used. Yet, such a conclusion would create problems
of divorce law replacing current jurisdictional problems. Most of the
difficulty in the area today stems from the subjectivity inherent in the
domiciliary concept. Although marriage may import public interest, and
although a particular state may have a predominant interest in the marital
relation which justifies giving its marital policies controlling importance,
to define predominant interest in terms of domicile is fraught with diffi-
culty.1 7 A more stable, realistic, and objective test is needed. Residence or
marital domicile are two alternative possibilities.'S Physical presence or
place of marriage are easily discernible; intent is not. Rejecting the domi-
ciliary test in favor of a more objective test for applicable divorce law and
determining that predominant interest is merely important as a choice of
law problem rather than a jurisdictional one would eliminate much of the
incongruity in existing divorce law.
Paul Gerding, S.Ed.
15 See note 10 supra. However, the protection afforded the interests of the state of
predominant factual concern by the domicile requirement may be lost if the defendant
actually litigates the question of domicile. In such circumstances the finding of domicile
is unassailable. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
16 See Hastie, J., dissenting in Alton v. Alton, note 4 supra, at 684-685.
17 One such difficulty is the likelihood that parties will perjure themselves to fulfill
the domicile requirement. See the discussion of this question in the principal case at 795.
18 On marital domicile, or where the parties were married, see the persuasive argument
in David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, note 14 supra.
